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More than half of those who died in the 2009 Black Saturday bushfires in Victoria, Australia, 
were sheltering inside a house at the time of their death. This marks a shift in bushfire fatality 
trends, which previously saw most fatalities occurring outside while residents attempted to 
protect assets or evacuate. This paper presents findings from research that examined people’s 
experiences of sheltering in and exiting houses, sheds, personal shelters and other structures 
on Black Saturday. Qualitative data were sourced from 315 semi-structured interviews with 
residents affected by the bushfires and 50 witness statements presented to the Victorian 
Bushfires Royal Commission. Results indicate that despite limited planning and preparation 
specifically for sheltering on Black Saturday, many residents protected themselves from fire 
by sheltering inside houses, other structures and in open spaces. Most sheltered actively, 
engaging in regular monitoring and action to protect the shelter and occupants. However, 
some found sheltering challenging due to heat, smoke and responsibilities for children, 
vulnerable household members and the incapacitated. Misconceptions persist about the safety 
offered by houses and, in particular, bathrooms during bushfires. Education and advice should 
emphasise the need to plan and prepare for active sheltering, regardless of whether people 
intend to stay and defend or leave. The paper offers recommendations to promote planning 
and preparedness for active sheltering and identifies areas for further research.  
 
 
Keywords: bushfire, wildfire, sheltering, community safety, disaster risk reduction
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1. Introduction  1 
173 people died and more than 2000 houses were destroyed in the 2009 Black Saturday 2 
bushfires in Victoria, Australia. Initial police reports indicated that 113 people died inside 3 
houses, 27 outside a house, 16 in or near cars, 7 in garages or sheds, 5 on roadways, 1 in an 4 
open land reserve, and 4 at a location outside the fire perimeter (AAP, 2009). Subsequent 5 
research examined the activities civilians were engaged in immediately preceding their death, 6 
finding that 26 people died defending a house or property, 7 protecting livestock or other 7 
assets, 35 while evacuating, 41 while sheltering after attempts to defend a house or property, 8 
47 while sheltering without attempts to defend, 3 in an indefensible shelter, and 3 in a shelter 9 
where activities are unknown (Blanchi et al. 2012).
1
 The large proportion of people who died 10 
inside while sheltering on Black Saturday marks a significant shift in bushfire fatality trends, 11 
which previously saw the majority of deaths occur outside while residents attempted to 12 
protect assets or evacuate (Haynes et al. 2010).  13 
 14 
The large loss of human life and property on Black Saturday led to the establishment of the 15 
2009 Victorian Bushfires Royal Commission (VBRC) (Teague et al. 2010). A key concern 16 
for the Commission was the viability of the ‘Prepare, stay and defend or leave early’ 17 
(PSDLE) policy. Under this policy, Australian fire services advised residents to prepare to 18 
stay and defend their homes and properties or leave before a bushfire occurred in their area 19 
(AFAC 2005). The Commission observed that the phrase ‘stay and defend or leave early’ did 20 
not accurately reflect what people do in bushfires, noting many will delay making a decision 21 
until they are directly threatened. The Commission concluded that a comprehensive bushfire 22 
policy must accommodate the different scenarios people might experience by providing 23 
different advice and more options, including the possibility of sheltering. State and local 24 
governments responded by designating ‘Neighbourhood Safer Places’ as places of last resort, 25 
and the Australian Building Codes Board (2014) developed standards for the design and 26 
construction of bushfire shelters for private use. Anecdotal evidence suggests that residents of 27 
bushfire risk areas are increasingly constructing or converting existing structures into bunkers 28 
(e.g. Webb and Landy 2013). Fire services have recognised that people might want to install 29 
private shelters and are providing advice relating to sheltering. Importantly, this advice 30 
emphasises that sheltering should be planned for as a ‘last resort’ or back-up in the event that 31 
evacuation or defence is not possible (e.g. CFA 2016a).  32 
                                                 
1
 These figures exclude 4 of the 173 deaths attributed to Black Saturday. Three were not directly related to the 





Figure 1: Areas of Victoria affected by bushfires during January and February 2009 (shaded 36 
dark grey) 37 
 38 
Despite greater emphasis on sheltering as a back-up or last resort, there have been few 39 
detailed studies of resident sheltering practices in Australian bushfires. Research has tended 40 
to focus on the decision-making and behaviour of people who evacuate when threatened by 41 
bushfire and those who remain to defend homes and property (e.g. Wilson and Ferguson 42 
1984; McLennan et al. 2012; Whittaker et al. 2013; McNeil et al. 2015). While some studies 43 
have highlighted dangers associated with ‘passive’ sheltering, usually in the context of 44 
fatalities (e.g. Haynes et al. 2010; Handmer and O’Neil 2016), relatively little is known about 45 
why and how people shelter.  46 
 47 
In the context of bushfire, we consider sheltering as any action to protect oneself from the 48 
immediate effects of flames, embers, heat and smoke. People may shelter for short or long 49 
periods of time, as their primary response or as part of other responses, such as defending or 50 
evacuating. In this paper, we draw a distinction between active and inactive sheltering, which 51 
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are characterised, respectively, by the presence or absence of attempts to regularly monitor 52 
conditions inside and outside the shelter, as well as actions to protect the shelter and its 53 
occupants.  54 
 55 
This paper presents findings from research that examined the circumstances and challenges 56 
people experienced when sheltering and exiting houses, sheds, personal shelters and other 57 
structures during the Black Saturday bushfires (Blanchi et al. 2015). The research entailed 58 
analysis of data related to resident decision-making and behaviour, and factors such as house 59 
design, fire behaviour and the surrounding landscape. This paper focuses on findings from a 60 
qualitative analysis of the Bushfire and Natural Hazards Cooperative Research Centre’s 61 
(BNHCRC) interviews with residents collected as part of the ‘2009 Victorian Bushfires 62 
Research Taskforce’ and lay witness statements to the VBRC (see Teague et al. 2010). 63 
 64 
2. Sheltering during bushfire  65 
Taking shelter is one of many options available to people seeking protection from hazards. 66 
While early evacuation is usually considered the safest option, numerous factors may prevent 67 
people from evacuating safely, including the inability to provide or receive an early warning 68 
(e.g. in cases of rapid onset or communication failure), road networks that prevent swift 69 
egress, and responses of citizens who may be unable or unwilling to leave (McCaffrey et al., 70 
2015; Paveglio et al., 2008).  Last minute evacuations are historically a major cause of 71 
bushfire fatalities in Australia (Haynes et al. 2010). Eight of the nine people killed in the 72 
2005 Eyre Peninsula bushfires in South Australia, for instance, died in or near cars while 73 
attempting to flee the fire (Schapel, 2008). On Black Saturday, the large number of people 74 
who died inside houses has often overshadowed the fact that 35 people died while attempting 75 
to evacuate (Blanchi et al. 2012).  The possibility that it may be safer to remain in a fire 76 
affected area than attempt last-minute evacuation is reflected in fire service emergency 77 
warnings, which may advise that it is too late to leave and that residents should seek shelter 78 
(e.g. AAP 2017).  79 
   80 
 81 
While some research into bushfires has documented sheltering behaviours (e.g. Handmer and 82 
Tibbits 2005), most studies focus on the roles played by occupants when defending houses or 83 
evacuating. This research has underpinned development of the PSDLE policy, which is based 84 
on evidence that adequately prepared residents can protect houses from bushfires (e.g. 85 
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Lazarus and Elley 1984; Wilson and Ferguson 1984; Ramsay et al. 1987; Handmer and 86 
Tibbits 2005; Whittaker et al. 2013), and that a large number of deaths have occurred during 87 
late evacuations (e.g. Krusel and Petris, 1992; McArthur and Cheney, 1967; Wilson and 88 
Ferguson, 1984; Haynes et al. 2010). However, numerous studies document the tendency for 89 
people to ‘wait and see’ what a fire is like, or wait until they are threatened, before deciding 90 
to stay or leave (Rhodes 2005; Tibbits and Whittaker 2007; Whittaker and Handmer 2010; 91 
McLennan et al. 2012; McLennan et al. 2013; Whittaker et al. 2013; McNeil et al. 2016). 92 
This approach increases the likelihood that residents will be forced into dangerous responses, 93 
such as late evacuation, untenable defence and inactive sheltering.  94 
 95 
Much early evidence of sheltering in Australia comes from the 1939 Black Friday bushfires 96 
in Victoria, where people working and living in the bush retreated inside structures such as 97 
houses, timber mills and dugouts to protect themselves from radiant heat and flames (Tibbits 98 
and Handmer 2005; Collins 2006). Judge Leonard Stretton’s (1939) Royal Commission into 99 
the fires recommended the construction of dugouts at all timber mill settlements, but noted 100 
that financial costs and liability fears had prevented their construction in the past. Research 101 
following the 1983 Ash Wednesday bushfires in Victoria found that many people remained at 102 
their homes to defend and/or shelter (Wilson and Ferguson 1984; Lazarus et al. 1984, Krusel 103 
and Petris 1992). The Bushfire Review Committee subsequently stressed the need to consider 104 
sheltering as an alternative to evacuation, observing that ‘a considerable number of people 105 
found communal shelter in large, well-constructed buildings and survived, even though the 106 
fire threat outside the buildings was acute’ (Miller et al. 1984, p. 162). The Committee 107 
proposed that the State Government construct or adapt school buildings for use as shelters ‘to 108 
mitigate the possibility of students being exposed to risk by being sent home ahead of an 109 
advancing fire front’ (Miller et al. 1984, p. 162). 110 
 111 
A number of studies provide insights into sheltering behaviour in the Black Saturday 112 
bushfires. In a survey of populations affected by the bushfires, Whittaker et al. (2013) found 113 
that very few residents (4%) sheltered throughout the fire in houses or other structures, 114 
vehicles or somewhere outside. Importantly, the study did not consider shorter-term, periodic 115 
sheltering. McLennan (2010) studied residents’ uses of informal places of shelter such as 116 
ovals, fire brigade sheds and schools on Black Saturday.  Some residents understood these 117 
places to be ‘designated’ places of assembly, while others ‘simply ended up there’ 118 
(McLennan 2010, p. 5). Very few people who sheltered on ovals or at CFA sheds made 119 
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preparations to shelter.  Studies of fatalities in the fires also identified a lack of awareness and 120 
preparedness among many of those who died (Handmer et al. 2010; Blanchi et al. 2014). 121 
Handmer et al. (2010) report that 69% of those who died were sheltering at the time of death, 122 
but note that some of these people may have attempted to evacuate or defend prior to taking 123 
shelter. 124 
 125 
In the USA, where evacuation is the primary strategy for managing human populations 126 
during wildfires, researchers have questioned whether leaving is always the most appropriate 127 
option (e.g. Paveglio et al. 2008; Cova et al. 2009; McCaffrey et al. 2015). Large scale 128 
evacuations are complicated by population growth, road infrastructure limitations, challenges 129 
associated with the provision of early warnings, and the capacities and intentions of citizens 130 
(Cova et al. 2013; McCaffrey et al. 2015). Numerous studies report some US homeowners, 131 
often in rural and resource-based communities, do not intend to evacuate during wildfires, 132 
choosing instead to stay and defend or shelter (e.g. Cohn et al. 2006; Paveglio et al. 2010a; 133 
Paveglio et al. 2014; McCaffrey et al. 2015). A study of five residential developments 134 
designed to withstand wildfires and enable residents to shelter inside homes in Rancho Santa 135 
Fe, California, found that few residents intended to shelter-in-place and few understood what 136 
to do in a wildfire (Paveglio et al. 2010b). Those who did intend to shelter were more likely 137 
to understand the building codes and landscaping that made their homes more likely to 138 
withstand fire. Importantly, the authors emphasise the affluence of the communities studied, 139 
noting that it may be difficult to achieve the physical standards required for safe sheltering in 140 
more established or less affluent areas. Australian fire services distinguish strategies of ‘stay 141 
and defend’ and ‘shelter’ to emphasise the need for active defence for those who choose to 142 
stay in a fire, even though staying to defend may require periodic sheltering. 143 
 144 
In summary, Australian research has tended to focus on the decisions and actions of those 145 
who evacuate and those who stay to defend against bushfire, reflecting the ‘stay or go’ 146 
approach advocated by fire services. Consideration of sheltering is relatively limited, with 147 
studies largely focused on sheltering behaviours associated with fatalities. Further research is 148 
needed to examine people’s awareness and knowledge of sheltering as a protective response, 149 
as well as the planning, preparation and actions that are required to shelter safely during 150 
bushfires.  151 
 152 
3. Research methods 153 
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The research aimed to examine the circumstances and challenges people experienced when 154 
sheltering and exiting houses, sheds, personal bunkers and other structures during the 2009 155 
Black Saturday bushfires. Data were sourced from 611 semi-structured interviews with 156 
residents affected by the 2009 bushfires and 100 witness statements presented to the VBRC.  157 
 158 
Residents were interviewed over a 12-week period beginning on 12 February 2009 as part of 159 
the BNHCRC’s 2009 Victorian Bushfires Research Taskforce. The semi-structured interview 160 
guide comprised open-ended questions about residents’ planning and preparation, the 161 
information and warnings they received, their intended and actual responses, and what they 162 
thought they might do in future fires (see Whittaker et al. 2009). Interviews began with 163 
participants being asked to discuss their experience of the fire, with follow-up questions 164 
exploring the subjects noted above. A key strength of semi-structured interviews is that 165 
participants’ experiences and perspectives emerge more from their own understandings and 166 
personal narratives than from researchers’ conceptualisations of research problems or 167 
important issues (Marshall and Rossman 2014). Thus, while sheltering was not an intended 168 
focus of the research, the semi-structured nature of the interviews allowed data on sheltering 169 
to be collected. Interviews were conducted at residents’ homes or properties, typically lasted 170 
around an hour, were digitally recorded with each participant’s consent, and transcribed. 171 
Unfortunately, detail of the demographic composition of the interview sample was not kept 172 
and was, therefore, unavailable to researchers. Nevertheless, examination of the interview 173 
data set reveals perspectives and experiences from a diverse array of people throughout the 174 
fire affected areas. Ethics approval for the interviews was obtained from RMIT University’s 175 
Human Ethics Research Committee, with measures taken to protect the safety and rights of 176 
participants and researchers. Anonymity was assured to all participants, who gave their 177 
consent for aggregated data and quotes to be used in publications.   178 
 179 
The 611 interview transcripts and 100 witness statements were searched for references to 180 
sheltering, producing a dataset of 315 interviews and 50 witness statements for analysis. 181 
These documents capture a range of sheltering experiences, from periodic sheltering as part 182 
of property defence to inactive sheltering throughout the fire. Interviews and witness 183 
statements where sheltering was not discussed were excluded; however, this does not mean 184 
that these residents did not shelter at some point during the fire. The semi-structured nature of 185 
the interviews meant that interviewees were not asked a consistent set of questions, including, 186 
for example: ‘Did you take shelter at any point during the fire?’ Consequently, the analysis 187 
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presented in this paper did not seek to quantify data gathered from the interviews or witness 188 
statements (see McPherson and Sauder 2015). Nevertheless, we use verbal counts to convey 189 
whether experiences and issues were common (i.e. occurring in more than 50% of the 190 
interviews) or not (less than 20%) using terms such as ‘many people’, ‘commonly’ and ‘few’ 191 
(see Sandelowski 2001).   192 
 193 
NVivo v.11 (QSR International) was used to manage the large volume of data and to assist the 194 
analysis. The primary purpose of the interview and witness statement analysis was to provide 195 
detailed evidence of people’s experiences and understanding of sheltering during the 196 
bushfires. We employed a general inductive approach, whereby general categories are 197 
developed from the research aims and more specific categories emerge from multiple 198 
interpretations of the raw data (Thomas 2006). For example, ‘Intention to shelter’ was an 199 
initial category that, through the process of coding, was refined to include the sub-categories 200 
‘as a primary strategy’ and ‘as a backup or last resort’. Similarly, the category ‘Future plans 201 
for sheltering (or not)’ was added after analysis of multiple transcripts. An ‘Emerging 202 
themes’ category was also included and later refined to include sub-categories for beliefs 203 
about the safety of houses, bathrooms, ‘safe houses’ and community refuges. The iterative 204 
and inductive process of coding led to the creation of categories that more accurately 205 
reflected the content of interviews, allowing important issues and themes to be identified and 206 
data to be more closely analysed (Bazely and Jackson 2013). Quotes have been selected to 207 




1. Intention to shelter: 
a. as a primary strategy 
b. as a backup or last resort  
 
2. Planning and preparation for sheltering 
a. before 7 February 
b. on 7 February 
 
3. Factors and decisions leading to sheltering (or not) 
 
4. Experiences of sheltering and exiting 
a. where people sheltered 
b. how people sheltered, what they did 
c. when people exited, and why 
d. challenges experienced 
 10 
e. things that helped 
 
5. Examples of ‘active’ and ‘inactive’ sheltering 
 
6. Health issues associated with sheltering 
 
7. Future plans for sheltering (or not) 
 
8. Emerging issues 
a. Safety of houses 
b. Bathrooms 
c. Safe houses and community refuges 




Table 1: Coding framework for analysis of interview and witness statement data 212 
 213 
 214 
4. Research findings  215 
4.1 Intentions, plans and preparations for sheltering 216 
A small number of interviewees reported their intention to shelter throughout a bushfire. 217 
These included people who intended to leave home for a nearby place of shelter, those who 218 
intended to shelter inside while others defended, and those who intended to shelter without 219 
attempts to defend. Most often, these people intended to shelter in a house while others 220 
defended. Men often intended to stay outside and defend while women stayed inside, often to 221 
care for children, vulnerable household members and visitors.  222 
 223 
Some residents intended to shelter as a backup if they were unable to defend. There were 224 
very few instances where residents discussed sheltering as a backup if they were unable to 225 
leave. Those intending to defend often envisaged going inside during the main passage of the 226 
fire front and continuing defence once it had passed.  227 
 228 
I’d always had instilled into me the basic plan of: you’ve just got to withstand that front. 229 
I think when the cloud came and it got dark, I think that’s perhaps when people panic 230 
and get into cars and things, which I would never do… But here, that basic plan did 231 
work: protect yourself from the radiant heat of the front, and then get out. (Steels Creek) 232 
 233 
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Some residents identified where they would go if unable to shelter inside a house, including 234 
cellars, bunkers, sheds, dams, swimming pools, water tanks, cars and open spaces. Areas of 235 
burnt ground were recognised by some as a safe place to shelter.  236 
 237 
Levels of planning and preparation for sheltering varied substantially. Most residents focused 238 
their efforts on measures to enable defence or safe evacuation. They rarely had a firm plan for 239 
where and how they would shelter, often envisaging themselves sheltering ‘somewhere 240 
outside’, in a dam or waterbody, or at a neighbour’s house. Others identified one or more 241 
specific locations where they might be able to shelter. A very small number of people 242 
rehearsed their plan for sheltering. Varied levels of preparedness for sheltering are evident in 243 
the following quotes: 244 
 245 
If the house had caught early, I guess we would have found a space of refuge. But it’s 246 
hard to know because it seemed like for about two hours there were moments when there 247 
was a lot of smoke out there. So I guess we had our blankets, we could get out and go 248 
under the blankets. I don’t know… (Kinglake West) 249 
 250 
We have an area under the house here, like a cellar, completely bricked in. And there are 251 
some air vents, but we had rags and things like that. If needed, we could block those… 252 
So the idea was that mum would go down there. We even did a little dummy run in the 253 
afternoon. I took her down there and sat her in the chair and said ‘If a fire comes, this is 254 
where you’re going to be sitting’. And we had our drinks, a little Esky [ice box] and 255 
things. We had a bucket with some wet towels… We had our dog… He was tied up under 256 
there. So that was all sort of ready. (Callignee) 257 
 258 
Preparations made to assist in the defence of houses, such as clearing vegetation and blocking 259 
and filling gutters with water, undoubtedly increased the likelihood that residents could 260 
shelter safely, if only for a short period of time. However, some residents discussed 261 
preparations made specifically for sheltering. They filled baths, sinks and containers with 262 
water, and placed wet towels around the house. Some put shutters over windows or pulled 263 
down blinds, and some moved furniture and other flammable items away from the windows. 264 
Some had protective clothing to wear while defending and sheltering including woollen 265 
clothes, full-length overalls, work boots, masks, helmets and gloves. 266 
  267 
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We had put a hose onto the laundry, a hose connection, so we could have an inside hose. 268 
I now want one in the kitchen – I don’t care how unglamorous it looks. And one in the 269 
bathroom, because that would give you the reach right through the house… We filled up 270 
the laundry sink, we filled up the bath. We had buckets all through, lined up. So in the 271 
house I was just mostly watering down all the doors throwing buckets at all the edges of 272 
all the windows. (Kinglake West)  273 
 274 
Importantly, some residents were surprised by the arrival of the fire and had insufficient time 275 
to enact their final preparations. Typically, these residents undertook a significant amount of 276 
preparation on the day such as setting up fire pumps, wetting down houses and filling bins 277 
and containers with water. The unexpected arrival of the fire meant that some residents were 278 
not adequately prepared to actively defend or shelter. 279 
 280 
4.2 Activity during sheltering 281 
Based on our analysis of interview transcripts, a distinction can be drawn between active and 282 
inactive sheltering. Active sheltering is characterised by regular monitoring of the fire and 283 
conditions inside and outside the place of shelter, as well as actions to protect the shelter and 284 
its occupants. Such actions include extinguishing fires, preventing the entry of smoke, and 285 
caring for vulnerable people. Inactive sheltering is characterised by a lack of regular 286 
monitoring and actions to protect the shelter and occupants.  287 
 288 
Evidence suggests that the majority of residents who sheltered on Black Saturday sheltered 289 
actively. However, there were households where one or more people sheltered inactively, 290 
often children and the elderly, while others defended or actively sheltered. Cases of ‘total’ 291 
inactive sheltering were more common among those who had bunkers, and those who found 292 
themselves sheltering unexpectedly. In 325 cases of sheltering examined as part of the wider 293 
study (Blanchi et al. 2015) there were only 22 (6.7%) cases where all members of the 294 
household sheltered inactively throughout the fire. They survived because the house or 295 
structure they were sheltering in did not ignite or, as noted below, because others alerted 296 
them to the presence of a fire. Some did, however, suffer burns and smoke inhalation. 297 
 298 
The vast majority of residents who sheltered described taking at least some protective action, 299 
and some sheltered in houses or structures that were defended by others. People who were 300 
more active described regularly monitoring the progress of the fire and the immediate 301 
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surrounds of the house. Interviewees described how they regularly ‘patrolled’ the exterior of 302 
the house to check for ignitions. Some also monitored the interior of the house, including roof 303 
spaces, for signs of fire. Preparation was important in enabling people to monitor effectively. 304 
Some residents brought ladders inside to access roof spaces, and had appropriate clothing and 305 
equipment to allow them to monitor safely outside.  306 
 307 
We had the ladder propped up in the manhole. All I had to do was go up and stand at 308 
the top of the ladder, keeping watch on what was happening inside the roof, in case 309 
the sparks came in. They didn’t, but I would have been ready for them. I must say, the 310 
mining lamps were invaluable. They allowed us an excellent source of light… From 311 
time to time I came down and helped [my wife] in the task of patrolling from room to 312 
room, looking through the curtains. (Marysville) 313 
 314 
Residents proactively wet down internal and external walls, doors and windows. As 315 
houses began to fill with smoke, some residents lay on the floor or knelt over the bath with 316 
wet towels or blankets over their heads (see Section 4.6 for discussion of sheltering in 317 
bathrooms). 318 
 319 
Regular monitoring meant people were able to detect ignitions on, in and around the 320 
house, which they could then attempt to extinguish. In some cases, early detection meant 321 
fires were extinguished relatively easily. However, there were cases where undetected 322 
fires took hold or where residents were unable to go outside safely to extinguish fires. One 323 
interviewee, for example, had been sheltering inside a public building when onlookers 324 
alerted her to the fact that it was on fire, enabling her to exit safely. While some people 325 
exited immediately when their house caught fire, others tried to wait until the fire outside 326 
subsided. A number of interviewees described moving progressively through the house 327 
and exiting at the last moment. 328 
 329 
[The fire] got me from the back of the house. Once it had caught, I was blocking off 330 
room by room in order to stay in long enough for the fire front to go through. Because 331 
I knew the southwesterly [wind change] was due. It was so due, so close to coming 332 
through. And at one point the house started to fill with smoke …  I realised at that 333 
point that if I didn’t get out of the house I was going to die … So I grabbed my mobile, 334 
I grabbed my handbag, I tried to grab my files but they fell and burst open. And I 335 
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grabbed the one dog that was near the door and I tried to get the others out and I 336 
couldn’t, they wouldn’t come… My car was untouched. And I took a punt. (St 337 
Andrews) 338 
 339 
Most people were able to recognise when fire had subsided and it was safe to go outside.  340 
In a few instances, residents did not monitor the fire and remained inside houses that filled 341 
with smoke or caught alight. The presence of others who were monitoring most likely 342 
saved their lives. For example, one interviewee explained how her fear rendered her 343 
impassive during the bushfire and was saved by another occupant who checked conditions 344 
outside and persuaded her to exit. Monitoring also included checking on the safety and 345 
wellbeing of people outside defending. 346 
 347 
The house filled with smoke and it got darker and darker until it was totally pitch 348 
black. And I’m totally still believing the safest place is to stay in the house. Outside I 349 
knew there were flames, so from my preparation… I was going to stay inside that 350 
house. I’d have [died] with the smoke, because we were starting to pass out, and she 351 
fortunately rushed out and said, ‘No, come out here. It’s perfectly safe… The smoke 352 
was getting really easy, like it was like an anesthetic. It was just like I was starting to 353 
really start going under ... So she saved my life by going out then. And it was clear – 354 
it was so safe out there. (Steels Creek)  355 
 356 
4.3 Challenges associated with sheltering 357 
People faced a range of challenges while travelling to a shelter and while sheltering. A 358 
lack of visibility when the fire arrived made it difficult for some people to find and reach 359 
their intended place of shelter. In some cases, limited visibility forced people to shelter at 360 
locations they had not intended. Some described being affected by smoke, which impacted 361 
on their health and decision-making. Smoke affected some people to such a degree that 362 
they almost ‘passed out’. Others were affected by heat and suffered from exhaustion, 363 
dehydration and injuries. Lack of appropriate footwear and clothing accounted for some 364 
injuries.   365 
 366 
Sheltering with children 367 
Interviewees reported that sheltering with children was extremely challenging. The presence 368 
of infants and small children meant some adults were unable to assist in house defence or 369 
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regularly monitor inside and outside. Some sheltered with children in bathrooms, darkened 370 
rooms or other confined spaces in the house that provided protection from the fire but often 371 
with limited visibility or opportunity for egress. A very small number of interviewees left 372 
children unsupervised in these spaces, some with pets, and checked on them periodically. 373 
 374 
We had a two-year-old baby in here too that was freaking out… So we had to come 375 
inside. We shut all the doors because smoke and everything was coming in… I got all 376 
the ice and stuff out of the fridge, put it on the floor, put the baby there. (Pheasant 377 
Creek) 378 
 379 
[My daughter’s] head, even though I had her in a woolen outfit, wet in the bath, her 380 
head was boiling. I just kept wetting her down and getting her to suck on a wet face 381 
washer. And [my son], he did really well for the first 24 hours and then he 382 
deteriorated with the smoke in the air. He had an asthma attack in hospital the next 383 
day. So we were very lucky. (Kinglake) 384 
 385 
Sheltering with the incapacitated 386 
A small number of interviewees found themselves caring for people who were injured in 387 
the fires, including those with major and minor burns, smoke inhalation and other injuries.  388 
They were often distracted from intended activities such as defending the house and 389 
actively sheltering. They played important roles in providing first aid and assisting the 390 
incapacitated, as well as caring for people who were traumatised.  391 
 392 
We had the next door neighbours in, the people from across the road. Once they were 393 
in there, that’s all we were doing… They were fully aware that [people in the house] 394 
were dead… [Name removed] was screaming a lot so I had to try and distract her all 395 
the time to keep her calm because I was worried about everybody else freaking out. 396 
And [name removed], I think he’s twelve, was just wanting to get out and run, and so 397 
we had to try and keep him from going hysterical and running outside ... He was 398 
aware that [relatives] in the house had died... So yes, they were all fully aware of 399 
what was happening so you couldn't leave them for a second. And [name removed] 400 
wasn’t breathing well so we had to keep her breathing and we had to keep everyone’s 401 
liquids up… They had to be looked after constantly, so that's all we did. (Kinglake) 402 
 403 
 16 
4.4 Beliefs about sheltering 404 
Safety of houses 405 
Analysis of the interviews revealed a number of beliefs about sheltering that may have 406 
influenced sheltering behaviour during the bushfires. Beliefs about the degree of relative 407 
safety provided by houses were paramount. Those who believed houses provide safe refuge 408 
often recited agency advice to shelter inside during the main passage of the fire front, then go 409 
outside and continue defending. A small number of residents strongly believed that houses 410 
are the safest place to be and did not exit even when the house was filling with smoke or 411 
burning.
2
   412 
 413 
Some people questioned whether advice to shelter inside houses was sound in extreme 414 
bushfires. They often retold stories of houses that apparently exploded during the fires. These 415 
‘explosions’ were often thought to be caused by the build-up of extreme heat or pressure. 416 
 417 
I’ve been to CFA meetings over the years and they’ve said: ‘Houses don’t explode. It 418 
takes 18 minutes… for a house to really get up and burning. So you’ve got ‘this’ amount 419 





One interviewee explained how he opened windows in his house during the bushfire to 423 
prevent the build-up of heat inside, which he claimed would have caused the house to 424 
explode. Official advice during bushfires is to close windows, doors and other openings to 425 
prevent the entry of embers.  426 
 427 
Years ago someone told me: ‘You’ve got to have at least a couple of windows open in 428 
your house’, because… the heat outside and the heat inside the house can’t escape. So it 429 
actually gets hotter than what it is outside… So I opened a couple of windows, and a 430 
couple of doors because I thought ‘Well, stuff the smoke’, and I know now in my own 431 
mind that if I hadn’t done that my house would have exploded from the inside out, 432 
because that’s what happens. (Hazeldene) 433 
 434 
Safety of bathrooms 435 
                                                 
2
 See interview quote from Steels Creek in ‘Activity during sheltering’ section, above. 
3
 It is unlikely that this is an accurate recollection of CFA advice. 
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Bathrooms were seen by some as the safest room to shelter in, despite being a common 436 
fatality location within houses during bushfires (see Blanchi et al. 2012). The perceived 437 
safety of the bathroom appears to stem from the ready availability of water, particularly in the 438 
bathtub, the hard surfaces, and the contained nature of the room. It is noteworthy that children 439 
and pets were often confined to bathrooms, with and without the presence of adults. 440 
 441 
I went into the bathroom with the boys, obviously the smallest place, the safest place in 442 
the house. I filled up the bath… We just stayed there. We had blankets, water, torches. 443 
[Names removed] stayed outside until the fire hit, and then they came into the bathroom. 444 
(Castella) 445 
 446 
We had the kids in the bathroom, had all the windows sealed with wet towels around the 447 
house. Filled the bath, because that’s where the children were going to stay, in the 448 
bathroom, with the dogs. (Kinglake West) 449 
 450 
A member of a local CFA brigade who participated in the search for survivors after the 451 
bushfires mistakenly believed it was official policy for people to shelter in bathrooms. 452 
 453 
[Deceased persons] were in the bathroom exactly per the CFA guidelines… They were 454 
in the bathroom which has only one small external window, which she would not be able 455 
to get out of and, you know, it was in the back of the house and so the whole house would 456 
have been on fire… Why? Because they were in the bloody bathroom and the bloody 457 
bathroom hasn’t got an external door, the bloody bathroom hasn’t got a big enough 458 
window to get out of… (Marysville) 459 
 460 
Importantly, many interviewees were aware of the dangers of sheltering in a room with 461 
limited visibility and options for exiting. 462 
 463 
Existence of ‘Community refuges’ and ‘Safe houses’ 464 
Analysis of the interviews and witness statements revealed a number of references to 465 
local, informally organised ‘community refuges’ and ‘safe houses’. One so-called safe 466 
house in Kinglake West was the home of a CFA member who stayed to defend. It is 467 
unclear how residents identified the house as a place of shelter, and the occupant appeared 468 
unaware of people’s plans to shelter there. She asked people who arrived in the early 469 
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stages of the fire to leave because she did not want to be responsible for their safety. 470 
Residents who arrived during the peak of the fire did shelter at the house:  471 
 472 
We went to two other houses on the right-hand side down the road. As they burnt, we 473 
grabbed the kids and that house’s occupants and moved on to the next one. And [our 474 
neighbour’s] place, the big brick one on the left-hand-side, that’s where we finally 475 
took refuge. She had a room underneath the house… So we put all the kids in there, 476 
and all the animals. There were kids and dogs and cats everywhere. And we went out 477 
to help fight the fire. (Kinglake West)  478 
 479 
A house in Kinglake was also identified as a local ‘safe house’. A CFA assessment after 480 
the 2006 bushfire in the nearby national park had identified at least one house in the street 481 
as unsafe due to the proximity of vegetation surrounding the house. Another house in the 482 
street was apparently assessed as being safer because it was built of brick and had a 483 
generator, fire pumps, hoses and sprinklers. A number of people died at this house. 484 
 485 
‘Community refuges’ where residents believed they could shelter during bushfires 486 
included open areas such as sporting grounds, as well as commercial or community 487 
buildings such as schools, pubs, CFA sheds, wineries and hotels. The desire for 488 
community refuges was most apparent in Marysville, where people often identified 489 
Gallipoli Park oval, the Marysville Golf Club and the Cumberland Hotel as places of 490 
shelter.  491 
 492 
5. Discussion 493 
Australian research on community responses to bushfire has tended to focus on decisions and 494 
actions associated with evacuation and property defence. Indeed, research on the 2009 Black 495 
Saturday bushfires classified 96% as staying to defend or evacuating, with just 4% sheltering 496 
inside a house or other structure, vehicle, or somewhere outside (Whittaker et al. 2013). 497 
However, findings reported in this paper suggest that sheltering was far more common on 498 
Black Saturday. Most of those who sheltered did so for short periods of time during property 499 
defence or evacuation in order to protect themselves against flames, heat and smoke. Only a 500 
small number of interviewees reported sheltering inactively throughout the fire. These 501 
findings highlight the need for greater consideration of sheltering behaviour and advice in 502 
bushfire research and policy. 503 
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 504 
While numerous studies have highlighted the dangers associated with ‘passive’ sheltering 505 
(e.g. Handmer and Tibbits 2005; Haynes et al. 2010; Handmer and O’Neil 2016), few have 506 
considered the types of activity that might be required for people to shelter more safely. Our 507 
distinction between ‘active’ and ‘inactive’ sheltering more clearly communicates the need to 508 
regularly monitor the fire and conditions in and around the shelter, and to take action to 509 
protect the shelter and its occupants. Active sheltering was common despite limited planning 510 
and preparation for sheltering, suggesting opportunities to build on existing practices and 511 
knowledge to increase preparedness for sheltering. Education materials, warnings and other 512 
communications should use the term ‘active sheltering’ and convey the need for regular 513 
monitoring and protective actions. People must be able to monitor all rooms and building 514 
cavities for signs of fire, recognising that if a fire develops that cannot be suppressed then 515 
occupants should close off this region of the building and move towards an exit, then make a 516 
decision to exit based on a judgement of relative safety inside and outside the structure. Such 517 
advice is likely to be complex, and its application contingent on the unique circumstances and 518 
conditions people experience during a fire.  519 
 520 
Our results indicate a limited degree of preparedness for sheltering on Black Saturday. While 521 
some residents had prepared for the possibility of shelter, most preparations appear to have 522 
been made to enable safe defence or evacuation, reflecting the ‘stay or go’ dualism identified 523 
by the Royal Commission (Teague et al. 2010). Preparations to enable defence are likely to 524 
have aided sheltering because they increase the probability of structure survival, particularly 525 
when occupants take action to protect or defend the structure (Ramsay et al. 1987; Blanchi 526 
and Leonard 2008; Stephens et al. 2009). Nevertheless, those who intend to stay and defend 527 
should be prepared for the possibility of shelter, whether periodically as part of defence or as 528 
a last resort if defence is unsuccessful. The finding that those who intend to leave were less 529 
prepared to shelter is consistent with previous research, which suggests that ‘leavers’ are 530 
often among the least prepared (Penman et al. 2013; Penman et al. 2016). Because they do 531 
not envisage themselves being home during a fire, they may not prepare their house and 532 
property to increase its chances of withstanding a fire and provide a place of shelter for 533 
occupants. Since Black Saturday, fire services have more clearly communicated the need for 534 
people to have back-up plans in case they are unable to leave or defend (e.g. CFA 2016b). 535 
Research is needed to investigate whether people are heeding this advice and whether their 536 
plans include provisions for sheltering.   537 
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 538 
Importantly, the research provides insights into challenges experienced by people while 539 
sheltering. Most notably, responsibilities for dependants, often children, prevented some 540 
people from enacting their plan to defend or sheltering actively on Black Saturday. Reflecting 541 
the gendered nature of bushfire response (e.g. Eriksen 2014; Whittaker et al. 2016), these 542 
roles were often fulfilled by women. It is particularly concerning that some children were left 543 
alone in confined spaces such as bathrooms with limited visibility and opportunity for egress. 544 
Where possible, arrangements should be made for infants and children to leave for a place of 545 
safety before a bushfire threatens. However, it may not be possible to leave and preparations 546 
should be made for supervised, active sheltering in a room that allows monitoring and swift 547 
egress. Research by Towers (2015) highlights children’s capacities to engage in household 548 
discussions and planning for bushfire, suggesting opportunities to develop education 549 
materials specifically for children to encourage active sheltering. The potential for children to 550 
facilitate enhanced household bushfire preparedness should not be underestimated. There is 551 
also potential to tailor messages specifically for women, who, due to their often greater 552 
responsibilities for children and other dependants, may be more receptive to messages about 553 
preparing for active sheltering. The challenges of sheltering with those who are injured, 554 
suffering trauma or incapacitated are likely to be more difficult to plan for, particularly in 555 
situations where people arrive unexpectedly to shelter. Where the plan is to stay and defend, 556 
risks can be reduced by ensuring there are multiple, able-bodied adults available to defend 557 
(see Whittaker et al. 2013). This increases the likelihood that, should a person be diverted 558 
from defence or is incapacitated, active defence can continue. 559 
 560 
Beliefs about the safety of houses and, in particular, bathrooms influenced sheltering 561 
behaviour on Black Saturday. People who stayed to defend often believed the house would 562 
provide safe refuge during the main passage of the fire front, enabling temporary shelter 563 
before resuming defence. This view firmly reflects official fire service advice about staying 564 
to defend, which emphasises the need to protect oneself from radiant heat by moving inside 565 
when necessary (e.g. CFA 2013). Others, however, saw the house as the safest place to be in 566 
a bushfire and did not exit even when the house became untenable. In some cases this 567 
reflected a belief in the safety of the house and in others appeared to be motivated more by a 568 
fear of the fire. Bathrooms were often perceived as the safest room to shelter in, primarily 569 
because of the availability of water and the contained nature of the room. Sheltering in 570 
bathrooms may discourage active sheltering, particularly as options for monitoring and egress 571 
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are often limited. The danger of sheltering in bathrooms is highlighted by Blanchi et al. 572 
(2014), who recorded 37 fatalities in these spaces (22% of all deaths) on Black Saturday.  573 
 574 
Those who did not think houses provide safe refuge often believed that houses could 575 
‘explode’ in bushfires. Belief in exploding houses appears widespread (Odgers and 576 
Rhodes 2002; Handmer and Tibbits 2005; Cohen et al. 2006). Scientific studies, however, 577 
maintain that houses do not explode (e.g. Ramsay et al. 1987; Leonard and McArthur 578 
1999; Stephens et al. 2009). In any case, belief in exploding houses persists and may 579 
encourage risky behaviour (such as opening windows and doors) and sheltering outside in 580 
unsafe locations. 581 
 582 
An important finding of the research is that many residents planned to shelter at local 583 
informally organised ‘community refuges’ or ‘safe houses’. Community refuges broadly 584 
align with the ‘informal places of shelter’ studied by McLennan (2010) including ovals, fire 585 
brigade sheds and schools. However, this study also examined people’s understanding and 586 
use of so-called ‘safe houses’ on private property. In some cases occupants of these houses 587 
were unaware that others considered it a safe house. Sadly, some of the houses did not 588 
provide the safety people sought. Fire services should facilitate greater discussion and 589 
planning for sheltering within households and at the neighbourhood scale. Such a process is 590 
likely to reveal people’s intentions about when and where to shelter, and may present 591 
opportunities to dispel misconceptions about local ‘safe houses’ and other intended places of 592 
shelter. Governments and fire services, in recent years, have developed and implemented 593 
place of last resort to provide protection from the effects of the fire such as Neighbourhood 594 
Safer Places (e.g. CFA 2012; RFS 2012). The dangers associated with finding a place to 595 
shelter at the last moment should be emphasised. Locally, fire services and community 596 
bushfire groups (e.g. Community Fireguard groups and Community Fire Units) may become 597 
aware of informally organised community refuges and safe houses, presenting opportunities 598 
to initiate dialogue about the suitability of certain places for shelter and the planning and 599 
preparation required for active sheltering.  600 
 601 
The findings arising from this research suggest a number of opportunities for improving fire 602 
service communications to encourage preparedness for active sheltering. However, research 603 
consistently highlights the challenges of engaging the public in bushfire awareness and 604 
education campaigns (see McLennan et al. 2015). It is inevitable that some people will only 605 
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become receptive to bushfire-related information once they are threatened by an actual fire 606 
(McLennan et al. 2013; Whittaker et al. 2013). Therefore, in addition to awareness and 607 
education campaigns, emergency warnings should clearly communicate the need to shelter 608 
actively and provide basic information about how to shelter actively to people who may have 609 
limited awareness and understanding of bushfire.  610 
 611 
Finally, our results suggest that preparations for sheltering are likely to be made on the day of 612 
a fire, once it is clear that a fire is threatening. On Black Saturday, the unexpected arrival of 613 
the fire meant that some people did not have time to enact their final preparations or reach 614 
their intended place of shelter. This highlights that even where structures such as bunkers or 615 
community refuges are available, people may not have time to reach them safely. There is a 616 
risk that the presence of shelters could give people a false sense of security, thereby 617 
encouraging a lack of preparedness and last-minute decision-making. A number of factors 618 
may prevent people from reaching their intended place of shelter, including a lack of 619 
awareness of the fire threat; underestimating the time needed for household members to reach 620 
the shelter; underestimating the severity of the fire and associated conditions (e.g. radiant 621 
heat and smoke); and unanticipated contingencies such as road blockages or destruction of 622 
the shelter. For these reasons, the presence of a bunker or other form of shelter does not 623 
negate the need for bushfire planning and preparation. 624 
 625 
6. Conclusion 680 
This paper provides insights into the experiences of people who sheltered during the 2009 681 
Black Saturday bushfires. More than half of the interviewees in the BNHCRC Black Saturday 682 
data and witness statements recounted experiences of sheltering during the bushfires, 683 
suggesting that sheltering may be more common in bushfires than previous evidence suggests 684 
(e.g. Whittaker et al. 2013). Indeed, our study draws attention to short-term, periodic 685 
sheltering undertaken as part of property defence or evacuation, which has received scant 686 
attention in the literature.  687 
 688 
Sheltering is a necessary consideration for people who live and work in areas at risk from 689 
bushfire, regardless of whether they intend to stay and defend or leave. Although results 690 
presented in this paper suggest a limited degree of planning and preparation for sheltering, 691 
preparations made by those who stayed to defend enabled many to shelter safely. 692 
Furthermore, this study found that the majority of those who sheltered during the bushfires 693 
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sheltered actively, engaging in regular monitoring and action to protect the shelter and its 694 
occupants. Education materials and campaigns to encourage planning and preparation for 695 
active sheltering are needed, but should emphasise that sheltering should not be planned for 696 
as a sole response. Initiatives should underline the importance of regular monitoring and 697 
actions required to protect the shelter and its occupants, including timely egress. They should 698 
also encourage local dialogue about the suitability of places of shelter, including informally 699 
organised community refuges and so-called safe houses.  700 
 701 
There remains much to learn about sheltering during bushfires. With the exception of 702 
McLennan’s (2010) study of informal places of shelter on Black Saturday, sheltering has not 703 
been an explicit focus of research. Research is needed to more fully investigate people’s 704 
awareness and knowledge of sheltering as a protective response, their intentions and 705 
preparation for sheltering, and the actions they take to protect themselves during actual fires. 706 
Some residents declared their intention to rebuild houses or construct bunkers to enable 707 
sheltering after Black Saturday (see Blanchi et al. 2015). Research is needed to investigate 708 
the degree of protection offered by these structures. Similarly, other community shelters such 709 
as Neighbourhood Safer Places have been designated in most Australian States and 710 
Territories, yet little is known about how people understand and intend to use them. Such 711 
research will provide an evidence base for strategies that aim to increase preparedness for 712 






This project was funded by the Australian Government under the Natural Disaster Resilience 718 
Grants Scheme (NDRGS). In the State of Victoria, the NDRGS is facilitated by Emergency 719 
Management Victoria. We gratefully acknowledge all the people who contributed to this 720 
research, particularly the residents impacted on Black Saturday who gave their time to share 721 
their knowledge and experience. Without their assistance this study would not have been 722 
possible. We also thank the Country Fire Authority, and in particular Mark Holland, for their 723 
valuable assistance and support. We thank Stephanie Dreyfuss for her assistance in compiling 724 
literature and policy documents related to sheltering. We also acknowledge the support of the 725 
Bushfire and Natural Hazards Cooperative Research Centre (www.bnhcrc.com.au), which 726 






Australian Associated Press (2009) Black Saturday data reveals where victims died. 732 
Available at: http://www.theage.com.au/national/black-saturday-data-reveals-where-victims-733 
died-20090528-borp.html [Verified 14 December 2016] 734 
 735 
Australian Associated Press (2017) ‘Too late to leave’: Emergency warning as RFS battles 736 
Queanbeyan grass fire. Available at: http://www.sbs.com.au/news/article/2017/02/17/too-737 
late-leave-emergency-warning-rfs-battles-queanbeyan-grass-fire [Verified 27 March 2017] 738 
 739 
Australian Building Codes Board (2014) Private bushfire shelters. Available at: 740 
http://www.abcb.gov.au/Resources/Publications/Education-Training/Private-Bushfire-741 
Shelters [Verified 11 January 2017].  742 
 743 
Australasian Fire Authorities Council (2005) Position paper on bushfires and community 744 
safety. AFAC Limited, East Melbourne.  745 
 746 
Bazely, P. and Jackson, K. (2013) Qualitative data analysis with NVivo. Second edition. Sage 747 
Publications, London. 748 
 749 
Blanchi, R. and Leonard, J. (2008) Property safety: judging structural safety, in Handmer, J. 750 
and Haynes, K. (eds) Community bushfire safety, CSIRO Publishing, Collingwood, 77-85. 751 
 752 
Blanchi, R., Leonard, J., Haynes, K., Opie, K., James, M. and Oliveira, F. (2014) 753 
Environmental circumstances surrounding bushfire fatalities in Australia 1901-2011. 754 
Environmental Science and Policy, 37, 192–203. 755 
 26 
 756 
Blanchi, R., Whittaker, J., Haynes, K., Leonard, J., Opie, K. and Holland, M. (2015) 757 
Sheltering practices during bushfire. Available at: 758 
(https://publications.csiro.au/rpr/pub?pid=csiro:EP149094) [Verified 20 January 2017].  759 
 760 
Cohn, P.J., Carroll, M.S. and Kumagai, Y. (2006) Evacuation behavior during wildfires: 761 
results of three case studies. Western Journal of Applied Forestry 21 (1), 39-48. 762 
 763 
Cohen, E., Huges, P. and White, P.B. (2006) Battling ferocious flames: bushfires in the 764 
media. The Australian Journal of Emergency Management 21, 47-52.  765 
 766 
Collins, P. (2006) Burn: the epic story of bushfire in Australia. Allen & Unwin, Crows Nest. 767 
 768 
Country Fire Authority (2013) Defending your property: bushfire survival planning template. 769 
Available at: 770 
http://www.cfa.vic.gov.au/fm_files/attachments/plan_and_prepare/frk/4713_CFA_Pullout_D771 
EFEND_web.pdf [Verified 11 January 2017]. 772 
 773 
Country Fire Authority (2012) Neighbourhood Safer Places. Available at: 774 
http://www.cfa.vic.gov.au/plan-prepare/neighbourhood-safer-places/ [Verified 26 April 2017] 775 
 776 
Country Fire Authority (2016a) Private bushfire shelters or bunkers. Available at: 777 
http://www.cfa.vic.gov.au/plan-prepare/private-bushfire-shelters-or-bunkers [Verified 12 778 
December 2016]. 779 
 780 
 27 
Country Fire Authority (2016b) Back up plans. Available at: http://www.cfa.vic.gov.au/plan-781 
prepare/back-up-plans/ [Verified 26 April 2017] 782 
 783 
Cova, T.J., Drews, F.A., Siebeneck, L.K. and Musters, A. (2009) Protective actions in 784 
wildfires: evacuate or shelter-in-place? Natural Hazards Review 10 (4), 151-162. 785 
 786 
Cova, T.J., Theobald, D.M., Norman, J.B. and Siebeneck, L.K. (2013) Mapping wildfire 787 
evacuation vulnerability in the western US: the limits of infrastructure. GeoJournal 78 (2), 788 
273-285.  789 
 790 
Eriksen, C. (2014) Gender and wildfire: landscapes of uncertainty. Routledge, New York. 791 
 792 
Handmer, J. and Tibbits, A. (2005) Is staying at home the safest option during bushfires? 793 
Historical evidence for the Australian approach. Global Environmental Change Part B: 794 
Environmental Hazards 6, 81-91. 795 
 796 
Handmer, J. and O’Neil, S. (2016) Examining bushfire policy in action: preparedness and 797 
behaviour in the 2009 Black Saturday fires. Environmental Science & Policy 63, 55-62. 798 
 799 
Handmer, J., O’Neil, S. and Killalea, D. (2010) Review of fatalities in the February 7, 2009, 800 
bushfires. Bushfire CRC and RMIT University, Melbourne. 801 
 802 
Haynes, K., Handmer, J., McAneney, J., Tibbits, A., and Coates, L. (2010) Australian 803 
bushfire fatalities 1900-2008: exploring trends in relation to the ‘Prepare, stay and defend or 804 
leave early’ policy. Environmental Science and Policy 13, 185-94. 805 
 806 
 28 
Krusel, N. and Petris, S.N. (1992) A study of civilian deaths in the 1983 Ash Wednesday 807 
bushfires in Victoria, Australia. Country Fire Authority, Melbourne. 808 
 809 
Lazarus, G. and Elley, J. (1984) A study of the effect of household occupancy during the Ash 810 
Wednesday bushfire in Upper Beaconsfield, Victoria, February 1983. National Centre for 811 
Rural Fire Research, Caulfield East. 812 
 813 
Leonard, J. and McArthur, N.A. (1999) A history of research into building performance in 814 
Australian bushfires, in Lunt, I. and Green D.G. (eds) Proceedings of the Australian Bushfire 815 
Conference, School of Environmental and Information Sciences, Charles Sturt University, 816 
Albury, 219-25. 817 
 818 
Marshall, C. and Rossman, G.B. (2014) Designing qualitative research. Sixth edition. Sage 819 
Publications, Thousand Oaks. 820 
 821 
McArthur, A.G. and Cheney, N.P. (1967) Report on the southern Tasmanian bushfires of 7 822 
February 1967. Forestry Commission Tasmania, Hobart. 823 
 824 
McCaffrey, S., Rhodes, A. and Stidham, M. (2015) Wildfire evacuation and its alternatives: 825 
perspectives from four United States’ communities. International Journal of Wildland Fire 826 
24, 170-178.  827 
 828 
McLennan, J. (2010) Use of informal places of shelter and last resort on 7 February 2009. 829 
Peoples’ observations and experiences – Marysville, Kinglake, Kinglake West, and 830 
Callignee. Bushfire CRC, East Melbourne.  831 
 832 
McLennan, J., Elliott, G. and Omodei, M. (2012) Householder decision-making under 833 
imminent wildfire threat: stay and defend or leave? International Journal of Wildland Fire 21 834 
(7), 915-25. 835 
 836 
 29 
McLennan, J., Elliott, G., Omodei, M. and Whittaker, J. (2013) Householders’ safety-related 837 
decisions, plans, actions and outcomes during the 7 February 2009 Victorian (Australia) 838 
wildfires. Fire Safety Journal 61, 175-84. 839 
 840 
McLennan, J., Paton, D. and Wright, L. (2015) At-risk householders’ responses to potential 841 
and actual bushfire threat: an anlaysis of findings from seven Australian post-bushfire 842 
interview studies 2009-2014. International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction 12, 319-327. 843 
 844 
McNeill, I.M., Dunlop, P.D., Skinner, T.C. and Morrison, D.L. (2015) Predicting delay in 845 
residents’ decisions on defending v. evacuating through antecedents of decision avoidance. 846 
International Journal of Wildland Fire 24 (2), 153-61. 847 
 848 
McNeil, I.M., Dunlop, P.D., Skinner, T.C. and Morrison, D.L. (2016) A value- and 849 
expectancy-based approach to understanding residents’ intended response to a wildfire threat. 850 
International Journal of Wildland Fire 25 (4), 378-89. 851 
 852 
Miller, S., Carter, W. and Stephens, R. (1984) Report of the Bushfire Review Committee on 853 
bushfire disaster preparedness and response in Victoria, Australia, following the Ash 854 
Wednesday fires, February 16, 1983. Bushfire Review Committee, Melbourne. 855 
 856 
Odgers, P. and Rhodes, A, (2002) Community Response to the NSW Bushfires 2001-2002. 857 
AFAC, Melbourne. 858 
 859 
Paveglio, T.B., Carroll, M.S. and Jakes, P.J. (2008) Alternatives to evacuation – protecting 860 
public safety during wildland fire. Journal of Forestry 106, 65-70. 861 
 862 
Paveglio, T.B., Carroll, M.S. and Jakes, P.J. (2010a) Alternatives to evacuation during 863 
wildland fire: exploring adaptive capacity in one Idaho community. Environmental Hazards 864 
9, 379-394. 865 
 866 
Paveglio, T.B., Carroll, M.S. and Jakes, P.J. (2010b) Adoption and perceptions of shelter-in-867 
place in California’s Rancho Santa Fe Fire Protection District. International Journal of 868 
Wildland Fire 19, 677-688. 869 
 870 
 30 
Paveglio, T.B., Prato, T., Dalenberg, D. and Tyron, V. (2014) Understanding evacuation 871 
preferences and wildfire mitigations among northwest Montana residents. International 872 
Journal of Wildland Fire 23, 435-444. 873 
 874 
Penman. T.D., Eriksen, C.E., Blanchi, R., Chladil, M., Gill, A.M., Haynes, K., Leonard, J., 875 
McLennan, J., Bradstock, R.A. (2013) Defining adequate means of residents to prepare 876 
property for protection from wildfire. International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction 6, 67-877 
77. 878 
 879 
Penman, T.D., Eriksen, C.E., Horsey, B. and Bradstock, R.A. (2016) How much does it cost 880 
residents to prepare their property for wildfire? International Journal of Disaster Risk 881 
Reduction 16, 88-98. 882 
 883 
Ramsay G.C., McArthur N.A. and Dowling V.P. (1987) Preliminary results from an 884 
examination of house survival in the 16 February 1983 bushfires in Australia. Fire and 885 
Materials 11, 49-51. 886 
 887 
Rhodes, A. (2005) Stay or go: what do people think of the choice? Paper read at ‘The 888 
Australasian Fire Authorities Council and Bushfire CRC Conference. AFAC Limited, 889 
Auckland. 890 
 891 
Rural Fire Service (2012) Neighbourhood Safer Places: places of last resort guidelines. 892 
Available at: http://www.rfs.nsw.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0017/26135/NSP-893 
Guidelines.pdf [Verified 26 April 2017] 894 
 895 
Sandelowski, M. (2001) Real qualitative researchers do not count: the use of numbers in 896 
qualitative research. Research in Nursing and Health 24 (3), 230-40. 897 
 898 
 31 
Schapel, A.E. (2008) Inquest into the deaths of Star Ellen Borlase, Jack Morley Borlase, 899 
Helen Kald Castle, Judith Maud Griffith, Jody Maria Kay, Graham Joseph Russell, Zoe 900 
Russel-Kay, Trent Alan Murnane and Neil George Richardson. Available at: 901 
http://www.courts.sa.gov.au/CoronersFindings/Lists/Coroners%20Findings/Attachments/310/902 
Wangary%20Fires%20Inquest%20-903 
%20MODIFIED%20and%20FINAL%20February%202008.pdf  [Verified 27 March 2017] 904 
 905 
Stephens, S.L., Adams, M.A., Handmer, J., Kearns, F.R., Leicester, B., Leonard, J. and 906 
Moritz, A. (2009) Urban-wildland fires: how California and other regions of the US can learn 907 
from Australia. Environmental Research Letters 4, 1-5. 908 
 909 
Stretton, L.E.B. (1939) Report of the Royal Commission into the causes and measures taken 910 
to prevent the bush fires of January, 1939, and to protect life and property and the measures 911 
to be taken to prevent bush fires in Victoria and to protect life and property in the event of 912 
future bush fires. State Government of Victoria, Melbourne. 913 
 914 
Teague, B., McLeod, R. and Pascoe, S. (2010) 2009 Victorian Bushfires Royal Commission 915 
final report: summary. Available at: 916 
http://www.royalcommission.vic.gov.au/finaldocuments/summary/HR/VBRC_Summary_HR917 
.pdf [Verified 14 December 2016]. 918 
 919 
Thomas, D.R. (2006) A general inductive approach for analyzing qualitative evaluation data. 920 
American Journal of Evaluation 27 (2), 237-46. 921 
 922 
Tibbits A. and Whittaker J. (2007) Stay and defend or leave early: policy problems and 923 
experiences during the 2003 Victorian bushfires. Environmental Hazards 7, 283-90. 924 
 925 
 32 
Towers, B. (2012) Children’s knowledge of vulnerability and resilience to bushfires. Ph.D. 926 
thesis, University of Tasmania, Hobart. 927 
 928 
Towers, B. (2015) Children’s knowledge of bushfire emergency response. International 929 
Journal of Wildland Fire 24 (2), 179-89. 930 
 931 
Webb, E. and Landy, S. (2013) Victorian residents invest in underground safety bunkers for 932 
bushfire season. Available at: http://www.heraldsun.com.au/news/victoria/victorian-933 
residents-invest-in-underground-safety-bunkers-for-bushfire-season/news-934 
story/0a2cb0a58c513dc514b011a97e4b452f [Verified 16 December 2016]. 935 
 936 
Whittaker, J., Eriksen, C. and Haynes, K. (2016) Gendered responses to the 2009 Black 937 
Saturday bushfires in Victoria, Australia. Geographical Research 54 (2), 203-215. 938 
 939 
Whittaker, J. and Handmer, J. (2010) Community bushfire safety: a review of post-Black 940 
Saturday research. The Australian Journal of Emergency Management 25, 7-13. 941 
 942 
Whittaker, J., McLennan, J., Elliot, G., Gilbert, J., Handmer, J., Haynes, K. and Cowlishaw, 943 
S. (2009) Victorian 2009 Bushfire Research Response: final report. Available at 944 
http://www.bushfirecrc.com/sites/default/files/managed/resource/chapter-2-human-945 
behaviour.pdf   [Verified 11 January 2017]. 946 
 947 
Whittaker, J., Haynes, K., Handmer, J. and McLennan, J. (2013) Community safety during 948 
the 2009 Australian ‘Black Saturday’ bushfires: an analysis of household preparedness and 949 
response. International Journal of Wildland Fire 22, 841-49. 950 
 33 
 951 
Wilson, A.A.G. and Ferguson, I.S. (1984) Fight or flee? A case study of the Mount Macedon 952 
bushfire. Australian Forestry 47, 230-36. 953 
 954 
